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A Child Conceived Through Artificial Insemination by
a Third-Party Donor Is llegitimate-Gursky v. Gursky
Husband and wife, upon discovery of the husband's inability to
father children, sought to have the wife artificially inseminated.
The husband gave his written consent to the clinical impregnation
and agreed to pay for it. As a result of the artificial insemination a
child was born. Subsequently, the wife sought an annulment and
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petitioned for support of this child. Held, annulment granted, and
child declared illegitimate.1 A child conceived through artificial
insemination by a third-party donor, even though done with the
consent of the mother's husband, is illegitimate.2 Gursky v. Gursky,
39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
As a result of the holding in the principal case, a child conceived by heterologous artificial insemination (AID)s will not
only be socially stigmatized, but he will also find it difficult to
bring himself under statutes that confer rights or privileges on
a "child" or on "children," since these terms are generally construed as referring only to legitimate children. 4 In addition, an
1. The court also held that, because of the husband's acts in consenting to the
artificial insemination, he was liable for the support of the child under either an
implied contract theory or by application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The
principal case is noted in 30 BooKL.YN L. Rv. 126 (1963); 64 COLUm. L. Rzv. 376
(1964); 26 GA. B.J. 188 (1963).
Compare Slater v. Slater, 1 All E.R. 246 (1953), where the English court stated
that if the wife, at the time she had the insemination treatment, knew she had an
annulment remedy available to her as a result of her husband's impotency, her consent
to undergo artificial insemination would amount to approbation of the marriage.
The theory seems to be that, by consenting to clinical impregnation, a wife vicariously
consummates the marriage and should be barred from pursuing an action for annulment.
2. The authority for the adjudication of the legitimacy question in the principal
case was N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 145: "If a marriage be declared a nullity or
annulled for any cause or under any conditions other than those specified in the
foregoing subdivisions, the court by the judgment may decide that a child of the
parties is the legitimate child of either or both of its parents."
3. There are two types of artificial insemination: homologous artificial insemination
(AIH) and heterologous artificial insemination (AID). Homologous artificial insemination
is used if either penial or vaginal malformation prevents fertilization in an otherwise
potentially fertile couple, and it involves the transfer of the husband's semen to the
wife's reproductive tract. See generally GLovE, AxTIcIAL INSEMINATION AMONG
HuMAN BEINGS (1948). Homologous artificial insemination creates no legal problems
since the offspring is the natural child of both parents. Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23
U.S.L. Wr-ic 2308 (Cook County Super. CL, Dec. 13, 1954), aff'd, 12 Ill. App. 2d 478,
139 N.E.2d 844 (1955). In heterologous artificial insemination, the person contributing
the semen is not the husband. This method is employed when the wife is fertile and
the husband sterile, or when the Rh factor would increase the likelihood of an
erythroblastic baby if the husband were also the father. Candidates for artificial
insemination are carefully screened and analyzed. A clinic at the Johns Hopkins
Hospital requires that the physician be well acquainted with the couple and familiar
with their intellectual abilities and emotional stability so that the characteristics of
the husband and wife can be weighed in selecting the donor. Guttmacher, The Role
of Artificial Insemination in the Treatment of Sterility, 120 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 442
(1942). See also Weisman, The Selection of Donors for Use in Artificial Insemination,
50 WEST J. SuRe. 142 (1942).
4. E.g., Frazier v. Oil Chemical Co., 407 Pa. 78, 179 A.2d 202 (1962) (illegitimate
child denied standing under wrongful death act to recover damages for the death of
his father); Sanchez v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 51 S.W.2d 818 (]rex. Civ. App.
1932) (in the absence of acknowledgment by putative father, an illegitimate child is
not within the term "child" as used in workmen's compensation act). For further
examples, see Jung v. St. Paul Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 223 Minn. 402, 27 N.W.2d
151 (1947); Trautz v. Limp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W.2d 135 (1931); State ex rel.
Canfield v. Porterfield, 222 Mo. App. 553, 292 S.W. 85 (1927).
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AID child will encounter serious disadvantages in the law of inheritance. Under the still widely accepted common-law rule, an
illegitimate child may not inherit from his natural father.5 Although statutes in nearly all jurisdictions permit an illegitimate
child to inherit from his natural mother,6 it is unlikely that such
a child who has been unintentionally omitted from his natural
mother's will would be protected by the pretermitted heir statutes,
providing that "children" so neglected may take against the will.7
Similarly, an AID child now may be denied the right to inherit
from his other maternal relatives, 8 and he may be prevented from
inheriting community property.9
Writers have suggested that the legal problems raised by artificial insemination'0 should be resolved by the state legislatures.
One suggested solution would involve modifying existing adoption
laws to permit a natural mother to adopt her own child.' At the
present time, most adoption statutes provide for adoption only by
individuals who are not the natural parents, or by a spouse who
marries one of the natural parents after the birth of the child. As
a result, the husband could adopt the child, but the child's own
mother could not, leaving it illegitimate as to her. However, even
if both parents could satisfy statutory requirements, additional
alterations of the adoption law would seem necessary since full
compliance with present adoption statutes necessitates disclosure
of highly personal information, a factor which might discourage
AID parents from seeking formal adoption. 12 Finally, many parents
5. E.g., People v. Moczek, 407 IUl. 373, 95 N.E.2d 428 (1950); In re Estate of Crapa,
344 Ill. App. 503, 101 N.E.2d 611 (1951); see generally 6 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY
660 (1952).
6. ATmNSON, WALnS 82 (2d ed. 1953).
7. See Kent v. Baker, 68 Mass. 535 (1854).
8. See Reynolds v. Hitchcock, 72 N.H. 340, 56 Ad. 745 (1903); In re Lauer, 76
Misc. 117, 136 N.Y.S. 325 (N.Y. County Surr. Ct. 1912).
9. See Wasmund v. Wasmund, 90 Wash. 274, 156 Pac. 3 (1916), where the court
held that, although the legislature had stated that an illegitimate may inherit as heir
to the mother, by failing to amend the community property section of the statute, the
legislature had impliedly intended to give an illegitimate child no property other than
the separate property of the mother. Contra, Lee v. Frater, 185 S.W. 325 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916).
10. For discussion and evaluation of some problems caused by artificial insemination, see Holloway, Artificial Insemination: An Examination of the Legal Aspects,
43 A.B.A.J. 1089 (1957); Radler, Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 39 MARQ.
L. REv. 146 (1955); Rice, AID-An Heir of Controversy, 34 NoTRE DAME LAW. 510
(1958); Weinberger, A Partial Solution to Legitimacy Problems Arising From the Use of
Artificial Insemination, 35 IND. L.J. 143 (1960).
11. E.g., Rice, supra note 10.
12. See Seymour & Koerner, Artificial Insemination: Present Status in the United
States as Shown by Recent Survey, 116 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2747 (1941), cited in 36 CmKENT L. REv. 1, 27 n.62 (1959), where the author indicates that adoption is impractical
in AID cases because both the husband and the wife usually want the manner of conception kept secret. They note that, in their experience as physicians, not one woman
told even her parents.
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of AID children would, through neglect or ignorance, fail to
comply with formal adoption procedures.
Most writers, therefore, have instead urged state assemblies
to enact legislation dealing specifically with artificial insemination.' s Bills designed to remedy the problems caused by artificial
insemination have been introduced in six state legislatures. In
four of these states, the bills would have legitimatized AID children
if the artificial insemination were done with the husband's consent. 14 The bill introduced in the Ohio legislature would have
prohibited AID, made all children so conceived illegitimate, and
imposed criminal sanctions upon violators of the provision. 15
Finally, the Minnesota legislature considered three bills simultaneously:' 8 one would have prohibited all artificial insemination, another would have permitted only homologous artificial insemination (AIH), 7 and another would have legalized both AIH and
AID.' 8 None of these various measures considered by the six
states ever came to a floor vote, probably because of the controversial nature of artificial insemination. 9 In at least one of the
states, public protest was leveled at the legislature simply because
it was considering legislation in the general area of artificial in20
semination.
13. E.g., Massey, Artificial Insemination: The Law's Illegitimate Child?, 9 VMu. L.

R v. 77 (1963); Radler, supra note 10; Weinberger, supra note 10.
14. Indiana, H. No. 350, 86th Sess. (1949). New York, where identical bills were
introduced four times, S. Int. 745, Pr. 2042, 171st Sess. (1948); S. Int. 778, Pr. 801, 172d
Sess. (1949); S. Int. 579, Pr. 587, 173d Sess. (1950); S. Int. 493, Pr. 493, 174th Sess. (1951).
Virginia, S. No. 199 (1948). Wisconsin, H. No. 407, A, 69th Reg. Sess. (1949).
15. Ohio, S. No. 93 (1955).
16. These three bills were concerned with the regulation of artificial insemination
and did not contain provisions defining the status of artificially conceived children.
See 8 FLA. L. REv. 304, 316 (1955).
17. See note 3 supra.
18. Minnesota, H. File 1090 (1949); H. File 1991 (1949); H. File 1092 (1949).
19. Although the New York state legislature has not acted, New York City has
passed an ordinance designed to regulate the practice of artificial insemination. Under
this ordinance, only duly licensed physicians "shall collect, offer for sale, sell or give away
human seminal fluid for the purpose of causing artificial insemination ....
N.Y.C.
SANITARY CODE § 112 (1948), revised, N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 21 (1959). The provision
also requires physical examinations of donors to ascertain their freedom from certain
diseases and hereditary defects, and the keeping of records, which are to be open
only to authorized persons. Ibid. Refer-ing to this ordinance, the court in the
principal case stated that, although it appeared to constitute a recognition of the
practice of artificial insemination, it had to be read within the framework of the recognized concepts of illegitimacy "and can in no wise be deemed to sanction the practice
of artificial insemination or to render legitimate any issue thereof." Principal case at
1086, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
20. In a letter to the author of a note in 8 FLA. L. REV. 304, 315 (1955), Senator
Chas. W. Root of Minnesota, who introduced all three bills, described the public
reaction as follows: "Extensive hearings were had on all three bills. Lobbying against
the bills was terrific. Most of the lobbyists made no distinction between the provisions
of the three bills. Certain religious groups became quite fanatical on the subject. The
personal abuse that I and members of my family took was unbelievable. Vicious
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A statute declaring all AID children legitimate from birth
would undoubtedly be the most desirable way of protecting AID
children from the disabilities of being illegitimate.2 ' However,
the public reaction to past attempts at legislative action would
suggest that any legislative solution, whether approving or prohibiting artificial insemination, would be met with strong opposition. Even modification of existing adoption laws would require
legislative action, and since such amendments probably would
be condemned as endorsing artificial insemination, it is likely that
the public would also react violently to them. Most politicians
would probably be unwilling to jeopardize their political careers
by sponsoring or advocating legislation on the highly controversial
subject of artificial insemination. It would seem, therefore, that
unless and until public opinion favors the passage of statutes
dealing directly with artificial insemination, it is up to the courts
to take the initiative and provide some measure of relief, both
for the parents and for the artificially conceived children.
Any judicial attempt to legitimatize AID children will be
22
futile as long as the courts are restricted by common-law concepts.
In the principal case and in an earlier Illinois decision,2 the courts
felt bound by the historically embedded legal concept that a child
begotten by a man who is not the mother's husband is illegitimate. 24 The law of adoption is equally restrictive since it requires
strict compliance with statutory provisions before adoption can be
consummated. 25 Equity courts, however, need not be bound by

settled concepts of the common law or strict legislative requirements for adoption when adherence would, in fact, work an inanonymous calls were received by the hundreds. No member of my family was
spared. For a considerable period it was impossible for my children to run errands to
the various shopping centers or otherwise venture on the streets. In all the twelve
years that I have served in the legislature, I have never seen anything that would
compare with these bills. My correspondence was so heavy that I had to hire one
girl who did nothing else except answer my correspondence with respect to these
bills." Ibid.
21. Although legislative action appears improbable at the present time, an excellent artificial insemination statute has been proposed. Massey, supra note 13, at 90.
22. There have not been many judicial decisions in this area. Doornbos v. Doornbos,
App. 2d
23 U.S.L. WEE- 2308 (Cook County Super. Ct., Dec. 13, 1954), aff'd, 12 Ill.
473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1955); Ohlsen v. Ohlsen, (Cook County Super. Ct., Ill., Nov.
1954); Hoch v. Hoch, No. 44-C-9307, Cook County Cir. Ct., Ill., Feb. 10, 1945; Slater v.
Slater, 1 All E.R. 246 (1953); MacLennan v. MacLennan, Sess. Cas. 105, Scots L.T.R.
12 (Sess. Ct. Outer House 1958); see Orford v. Orford, 49 Ont. L.R. 15 (1921). But see
Strnad v. Stmad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948), where the court found
the artificially conceived child to be legitimate on the ground that it had been "potentially adopted" or "semi-adopted." This is the only instance where a court has tried,
by analogizing to other precedent, to legitimatize an AID child.
23. Doornbos v. Doornbos, supra note 22.
24. Ibid.; Principal case at 1085, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
25. E.g., Ryan v. Foreman, 262 Ill. 175, 104 N.E. 189 (1914); Emmons v. Dinelli,
235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56 (1956); Seibert v. Seibert, 170 Iowa 561, 153 N.W. 160
(1915); Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922).
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justice. These courts could, by adopting a more imaginative approach, effectuate the intent of the parents by declaring AID
children legitimate. For example, equity has already extended
such relief when a child's foster parents have failed to comply
with adoption statutes. 2 If an individual takes a child into his
home with the understanding that he will adopt it, but he dies before adopting the child, many courts will apply the doctrine of equitable adoption and protect the child's interest in the deceased
promisor's estate.27 Although most courts require the existence of
an express contractual agreement to adopt before applying equitable adoption, 28 or adoption by estoppel as it is sometimes called, 29
some courts infer an agreement from the conduct and statements
of the parties and from the facts and circumstances of the case. 80
While the doctrine of equitable adoption serves as an instrument
of justice to protect the child from the fraud or neglect of the
foster parent, the requirement of an express or implied agreement
to adopt serves as a protective device for the person standing in
loco parentis.3 ' Equitable adoption, however, gives the child only
inheritance rights and not legitimacy; it has been thought inapplicable when suit is instituted during the foster parent's lifetime,
apparently on the ground that public policy dictates that the relationship of parent and child, an association predicated upon love,
should not be forced upon an unwilling and unnatural parent.3 2
26. E.g., In re Lamfrom's Estate, 90 Ariz. 363, 368 P.2d 318 (1962); In re Gary's
Estate, 69 Ariz. 228, 211 P.2d 815 (1949); In re Brehn's Estate, 41 Ariz. 403, 18 P.2d
1112 (1933); Sheffield v. Bary, 153 Fla. 144, 14 So. 2d 417 (1943); Chehak v. Battles,
133 Iowa 107, 110 N.W. 330 (1907); Niehaus v. Madden, 348 Mo. 770, 155 S.W.2d
141 (1941); Barney v. Hutchinson, 25 N.M. 82, 177 Pac. 890 (1918); Crilly v. Morris,
19 N.W.2d 836 (S.D. 1945); Garcia v. Quiroz, 228 S.W.2d 953 (rex. Civ. App. 1950).
Contra, Clarkson v. Bliley, 185 Va. 82, 38 S.E.2d 22 (1946); St. Vincent's Infants Asylum
v. Central Wis. Trust Co., 189 Wis. 483, 206 N.W. 921 (1926).
27. See cases cited note 26 supra.
28. E.g., Rieves v. Smith, 184 Ga. 657, 192 S.E. 372 (1937); Reeves v. Ellis, 257
S.W.2d 876 (rex. Civ. App. 1953).
29. Although courts frequently use "equitable adoption" and "adoption by
estoppel" interchangeably, the latter term is more properly applied when an individual specifically agrees to leave property at death to a child in return for the
right to raise it as his own, and he dies, having raised the child, but without keeping
his promise to leave the child property. E.g., Bergman v. Carson, 226 Iowa 449, 284
N.W. 442 (1939).
30. E.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 233 Fed. 775 (8th Cir. 1915); Monahan v. Monahan, 14
Ill. 2d 449, 153 N.E.2d 1 (1958); In re Garda's Estate, 45 N.M. 8, 107 P.2d 866 (1940);
Roberts v. Sutton, 317 Mich. 458, 27 N.W.2d 54 (1947); In re Estate of Firle, 197 Minn.
1, 265 N.W. 818 (1936); Kay v. Niehaus, 298 Mo. 261, 249 S.W. 625 (1923). See generally
Bailey, Adoption "By Estoppel," 36 TxAS L. Rv. 30 (1957).
31. It has been asserted that it is not unusual for an individual to accept an orphaned
relative or illegitimate child into his home, offering to such child the warmth and affection incident to the relationship between a natural parent and child, but with no
intention of legally adopting the child or making it an heir to his estate. Cavanaugh
v. Davis, 149 rex. 573, 583, 235 S.W.2d 972, 978 (1951).
32. Erlanger v. Erlanger, 102 Misc. 236, 168 N.Y.S. 928 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd
mem. 171 N.Y.S. 1084 (App. Div. 1918).
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The precautionary measures are unnecessary, however, when
an artificially conceived child is concerned since AID necessarily
involves a couple who clearly agreed to assume the duties and
responsibilities of parents. One of the parties to an artificial insemination is the real mother of the child, and the other consenting
party, the mother's husband, entered into a formal contract at
the time of insemination, declaring his intention to rear and care
for the child as his own. 33 For these reasons it is suggested that
equity, either at the insistence of the parents or on petition by the
child, should declare an AID child legally adopted as of the time
the husband consented to heterologous artificial insemination. 4
At the very least, courts should declare an AID child legitimate
when his mother and her husband have cared for him throughout
gestation and early infancy, treating him as their natural child.
There is judicial authority for changing the status of an illegitimate child through application of the doctrine of equitable adoption;3 5 furthermore, analogous authority exists in the common-law
doctrine that a court may determine a valid marriage exists, although none of the statutory prerequisites to marriage have been,
met, if injustice will thereby be avoided. 6 If parties to a relationship that begins with an illicit cohabitation can acquire the same
rights as those married pursuant to statute, surely an AID child,
who is the contemplated product of a valid marriage and in no way
responsible for the failure or inability of his mother and her husband to adopt him, should be deemed legitimate.
Predictably, this suggested solution will draw criticism that
courts of equity would undermine the purposes of adoption statutes by deviating from statutory language in applying equitable
adoption.37 Adoption statutes have been construed as intended to
accomplish several objectives, including protection of children
from unnecessary separation from their natural parents, avoidance
of adoption by persons unfit to be responsible for the care and
33. Principal case at 1084, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
34. In order -to prevent undesirable publicity in such cases, equity courts could
utilize adoption statutes which allow a court to exclude the general public from the
room where proceedings are held and which confine all papers and books relating to

such proceedings to separate files that are open to inspection only upon order by a
court of record. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1 (1959); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178
(1953); N.Y. Dom. RE.. LAw § 114.
35. E.g., Radovich v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 48 Cal. 2d 116, 308 P.2d 14
(1957); Taylor v. Coberly, 327 Mo. 940, 38 S.W.2d 1055 (1931); Fisher v. Davidson, 271
Mo. 195, 195 S.W. 1024 (1917). Contra, Hein v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1963).
36. E.g., Lavery v. Hutchinson, 249 Ill. 86, 94 N.E. 6 (1911); Argiroff v. Argiroff,
215 Ind. 297, 19 N.E.2d 560 (1939); Oatis v. Mingo, 199 Miss. 896, 26 So. 2d 453
(1946); Crawford v. Crawford, 198 Tenn. 9, 277 S.W.2d 389 (1955).
37. See Clements v. Morgan, 201 Tenn. 94, 296 S.W.2d 874 (1956), where the court
reiterated the general principle that the power to decree an adoption is purely a
creation of statute.
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rearing of children, and prevention of interference by natural
parents who may have some legal claim because of a defect in the
adoption procedure. 8s In addition, they have been interpreted as being designed to protect natural parents from reckless, imprudent decisions to give away their children, and to protect foster parents
from assuming responsibilities for a child about whose heredity
or mental or physical condition they know nothing.39 It is clear
that application of the doctrine of equitable adoption to AID
children would not conflict with any of these objectives since
the problems underlying adoption statutes are not raised by arti40
ficial insemination.
For many of the married couples in the United States who are
involuntarily childless, artificial insemination offers some hope for
a normal family. 41 It is estimated that nearly 100,000 families in
42
this country have had children through artificial insemination.
In addition to the ever-increasing use of artificial heterologous
insemination, reputable authority suggests that in certain cases it
is probably desirable socially. 48 A leading pediatrician has stated
that artificially conceived children
"emean more to families than children conceived in the normal
manner. But for artificial insemination, motherhood would be
denied the wife. The husband knows that at least half the child's
38. In re Adoption of Edman, 348 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. 1961).
39. Ibid.
40. Equitable adoption as a solution to the problems raised by artificial insemination
would not involve any separation of the child from his natural mother, and since
the biological father must waive all rights to his child, there would be no possibility
of subsequent parental interference. Since both parents are first investigated as
candidates for artificial insemination, there would be no question about their qualifications as responsible parents. Finally, because of the care used in the selection of
donors for artificial insemination and because the mother would be a party to the
adoption, both parents would be confident about the child's heredity and mental
and physical condition. See note 3 supra.
41. One out of ten married couples in the United States are unable to have
children in the usual manner. It is estimated that in 40% of the reported cases of
infertility, the cause is the husband's sterility. Weinberger, A Partial Solution to
Legitimacy Problems Arising From the Use of Artificial Insemination, 35 IND. L.J. 143
(1960).
42. Ibid.
43. The American Society for the Study of Sterility represents approximately five
hundred specialists in the field of sterility. At its meeting in Atlantic City in 1955
it adopted a proposal which approved artificial insemination as a desirable form of
medical therapy, provided it is done in accordance with the following conditions: (1)
that the married couple have an urgent desire to have their infertility problems solved
by artificial insemination; (2) that a physician carefully select a biologically and
genetically satisfactory donor; and (3) that the physician determine, after thorough
study, that the married couple would make desirable parents. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1955,
p. 53, col. 1 (City ed.). The proposal also stated that, from observation over many years,
the membership was impressed by the almost universal good results achieved. The
fact that some parents have returned for as many as four children by donor insemination was considered proof of the happiness it bestows. Ibid.
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inheritance is good-it comes from his own wife, and he has his
physician's assurance that the other half is of the best. Babies
conceived in this manner are wanted children. They are welcomed into families with love. I44know of not a single case where
things have worked out badly."
However, if the courts continue to attach the stigma of illegitimacy
to AID children, the potential advantages of artificial insemination may be overshadowed. Certainly there are those who believe
the practice to be morally wrong,45 but even they must admit the
need for recognizing its existence and remedying its problems, just as
they recognize the problems of divorce, which they may also find
objectionable. The law can legitimatize a child born from a commonlaw marriage4" or from a bigamous marriage, 47 relationships which
are initially illicit; the law can legitimatize an AID child if the
mother were to divorce her original husband and marry the thirdparty donor. 48 Common sense, as well as justice, now calls for the
courts to use the doctrine of equitable adoption to bestow immediate
and permanent legitimacy on all AID children.

44. Statement of Dr. Alan F. Guttmacher, head of the Department of Gynecology
and Obstetrics of Mount Sinai Hospital, New York, cited in 36 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
1, 30 n.67 (1959). But see Lamson, Panard & Meaker, The Sociologic and Psychological
Effects of Artificial Insemination With Donor Semen, 145 J. AM. MEn. Ass'N 1062 (1951).

45. Both the Catholic Church and the Church of England have condemned
artificial insemination as immoral and contrary to the laws of nature. For an excellent examination and analysis of religious views on insemination, see Lewisohn,
Human Artificial Insemination, 36 Cm.-KNT L. Rv. 1, 4 (1959). See also 7 SYRAcus,
L. REV. 96, 104, 105 (1956).
46. E.g., Dent v. Dent, 241 Ind. 606, 164 N.E2d 351 (1960); Dacunzo v. Edgye, 19
N.J. 443, 117 A.2d 508 (1955).
47. E.g., Green v. Green, 509 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1957).
48. E.g., MicH. STAT. ANN § 27.3178 (1943), provides that a child born out of
wedlock may be legitimatized by the marriage of his natural father and mother. See
4 VaRNam, AMmuCAN FAMILY LAws, §§ 242-245 (1936).

